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[Crim. No. 9944. In Bank. July 7,1966.]

In re MARGARET LOUISE McCARTNEY
on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Criminal Law - Former Jeopardy - 01fenses of Di1ferent
Degrees-Oonviction of Included 01fense: Homicide-Defenses.
-Defendant's conviction of second degree murder at her first
trial was an acquittal of first degree murder, and her conviction of manslaughter at her second trial was an acquittal of
second degree murder.
[2] Id.-Former Jeopardy-01fenses of Di1ferent Degrees-Conviction of Included 01fense: Homicide - Ohargi.J1g 01fenseOonviction of Included 01fenses.-An indictment or information charging murder also charges all lesser o1fenses necessarily included in the crime of murder, including voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 1159); and one who
has been charged with murder, convicted of manslaughter, and
had his conviction reversed on appeal, may be retried for manslaughter on the original indictment or information.
[3] Homicide-Limitation of Prosecution.-Where an information
charging nlurder was filed before the three-year period had run
against manslaughter, following the reversal of defendant's
conviction of second degree murder in the first trial and the
reversal of her conviction for manslaughter in the second trial,
she could be tried under the original information for manslaughter though the three-year period had then run or she
could move to have the information amended to reflect that she
could be convicted of no higher offense than manslaughter.

[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 311; Am.Jur., Homicide (1st ed
§572).
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 145; Homicide,
§ 28; [2] Criminal Law, § 145; Homicide, § 48; [3] Homicide,
§2.
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
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[6] Petitioner is not entitled to release, however, since he is
held under other valid judgments of conviction. The order to
show cause is therefore discharged and the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus is denied.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Burke, J., and
White, J.,. concurred.
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In re MARGARET LOUISE McCARTNEY
on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Criminal Law -

Former Jeopardy - Offenses of Different
Degrees-Conviction of Included Offense: Homicide-Defenses.
-Defendant's conviction of second degree murder at her first
trial was an acquittal of first degree murder, and her conviction of manslaughter at her second trial was an acquittal of
second degree murder.
[2] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Offenses of Different Degrees-Conviction of Included Offense: Homicide - Charging OffenseConviction of Included Offenses.-An indictment or information charging murder also charges all lesser offenses necessarily included in the crime of murder, including voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 1159); and one who
has been charged with murder, convicted of manslaughter, and
had his conviction reversed on appeal, may be retried for manslaughter on the original indictment or information.
[3] Homicide-Limitation of Prosecution.-Where an information
charging murder was filed before the three-year period had run
against manslaughter, following the reversal of defendant's
conviction of second degree murder in the first trial and the
reversal of her conviction for manslaughter in the second trial,
she could be tried under the original information for manslaughter though the three-year period had then run or she
could move to have the information amended to reflect that she
could be convicted of no higher offense than manslaughter.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 311; Am.Jur., Homicide (lst ed
§ 572).
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 145; Homicide,
§ 28; [2] Criminal Law, § 145; Homicide, § 48; [3] Homicide,
§ 2.
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.

July 1966]

IN BE MCCARTNEY
[M C.ld 830; 51 Cal.Rptr. 894. 415 P.Zd 7811)

831

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Order to show cause discharged and writ denied.
Joseph W. Fairfield and Ethelyn F. Black for Petitioner.
Evelle J. Younger, District Attorney, Harold J. Ackerman,
Chief Deputy District Attorney, Harry Wood, Robert Lord
and Harry B. Sondheim, Deputy District Attorneys, for
Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus
on the ground that her pending trial in the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County is barred by the prohibition against
double jeopardy and by the statute of limitations. (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 13; Pen. Code, § 800.)
On November 14, 1961, the District Attorney of Los Angeles
County filed an information in the superior court charging
that petitioner committed murder ~n or about October 23,
1961. (Pen. Code, § 187.) She was convicted of second degree
murder in a jury trial, but her conviction was reversed on
appeal. (People v. McOartney, 222 Cal.App.2d 461 [35 Cal.
Rptr. 256].) On retrial she was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192), but this conviction was also
reversed. (People v. McOartney, nonpublished opinion, Dis~
trict Court of Appeal, 2 Crim. 10410, Sept. 16, 1965.)
Petitioner's third trial was set for January 19, 1966. At
that time she moved that the information be dismissed,
contending that her conviction of manslaughter was an acquittal of the charged murder and that the information could not
be amended to charge manslaughter because the statute of
limitations for manslaughter had run. The trial court denied
her motion, but to avoid a possibly needless retrial granted a
continuance while she sought relief on habeas corpus.
[1] Petitioner's conviction of second degree murder at her
:first trial was an acquittal of first degree murder, and her
conviction of manslaughter at her second trial was an acquittal of second degree murder. (Gomez v. Superior Oourt, 50
Cal.2d 640, 643-647 [328 P.2d 976].) [2] An indictment or
information charging murder, however, also charges all lesser
offenses necessarily included in the crime of murder, including
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. (Pen. Code, § 1159 ;
People v. McFarlane, 138 Cal. 481, 484 [71 P. 568, 72 P. 48, 61
L.R.A. 245]; People v. Smith, 134 Cal. 453, 454-455 [66 P.
669].) Accordingly, a defendant who has been charged with
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murder, convicted of manslaughter and had his conviction
reversed on appeal may be retried for manslaughter on the
original indictment or information. (People v. McFarlane,
supra, 138 Cal. 481, 484; People v. Smith, supra, 134 Cal. 453,
454-455.)
[3] It is 01 no significance that the three-year period of
the statute of limitations for manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 8(0)
has now run. Had the information charging murder heen filed
after the three-year period, the statute would bar a conviction
for manslaughter. (People v. Stevens, 5 Cal.2d 92, 99 [53 P.2d
133] ; People v. Miller, 12 Cal. 291, 294-295; People v. Angelo,
24Cal.App.2d 626, 628 [75 P.2d 614]; People v. Meyers, 39
Cal.App. 244, 245 [178 P. 965].) Since the ·information was
filed before the three-year period had run, however, a manslaughter conviction is not barred. (People v. Brooks, 50
Qa1.App.2d .610,611 [123 P.2d 556].) Petitioner may be tried
under the original information or she may move to have the
information amended to reflect the fact that she can now be
convicted of no higher offense than manslaughter. In any
event, the jury will be instructed that manslf!.ughter is the
greatest offense for which she can be convicted. (People v.
McFarlane, supra, 138 Cal. 481, 485.)
,
The order to show cause is discharged, and the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus is denied.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Burke, J., and
White, J.,. concurred.

-Retired A880ciate Justice of the Supreme Court Bitting under asslgument by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.

